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Abstract
In this paper we develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations (OLG) model with
health shocks to analyze the life-cycle pattern of insurance choice and health care spending. We
use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and show that our model is able
to match the life-cycle trends of insurance take up ratios and average medical expenditures in
the U.S. We then demonstrate how this model can be used to conduct health care policy analysis
by evaluating the macroeconomic eﬀects of a counter factual health care reform using a system
of universal health insurance vouchers. Our results suggest that health insurance vouchers are
able to extend insurance coverage to the entire population but they also increase aggregate
spending on health. More importantly, we ﬁnd that the positive insurance eﬀect (eﬃcient
risk pooling) dominates the negative incentive eﬀect (tax distortions and moral hazard) which
results in signiﬁcant welfare gains for all generations when a payroll tax is used to ﬁnance the
voucher program. In addition, our results suggest that the choice of tax ﬁnancing instrument and
accounting for general equilibrium price adjustments are critical in determining the performance
of the voucher program.
JEL: H51, I18, I38
Keywords: Public health insurance, private health insurance, vouchers, dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model, endogenous health production
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11 Introduction
The U.S. health care system has come under great pressure in recent years. Close to 50 million
people do not have health insurance while the U.S. spends already more than 16 percent of GDP
on health care, more than any other OECD country. In addition, medical expenditures keep
increasing as Americans age. Increases in medical spending and low take-up ratios of private
health insurance do burden employers and households and jeopardize the solvency of public health
insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Many economists and policy makers have therefore
called for a comprehensive reform of the U.S. health care system.
Data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2004/2005 reveal an increasing trend
of health care spending over the life-cycle. The young spend a very small fraction of their income
on medical services whereas the old spend more than half of their income on medical services (see
ﬁgure 1). In addition, MEPS data also reveal a life-cycle pattern of private health insurance take
up rates that peak around age 55. Understanding the life-cycle behavior of health care ﬁnancing
and spending and how changes in public health policy aﬀect an economy’s resource allocation,
welfare and government budget is central to assessing the eﬀects of health care policy reforms.
The overall goals of this paper are to, ﬁrst, explore whether a model with an endogenous health
production process can reproduce the life-cycle patterns of insurance take-up rates and health
spending? Second, are these life-cycle patterns indicative of health insurance market failure or
of bad government policies? Third, what are the eﬀects of a comprehensive public health policy
program using health insurance vouchers on aggregates (i.e. optimal allocations and prices) and
welfare?
In this paper we therefore make two key contributions. First, we develop a stochastic overlapping
generations (OLG) model with an explicit role for health accumulation and insurance to explore
individual decision making on health insurance and medical spending over the life-cycle. We ﬁrst
develop a simple two-period model to explore analytically how insurance and health spending
decisions interact with consumption and savings decisions in a dynamic setting. Our simple dynamic
two-period model with endogenous health indicates that the health insurance and spending decisions
are confounded with savings- and human capital eﬀects that make the multi-period setting more
intricate than the simple one period settings of classical insurance papers like Pauly (1968). In
addition, our simple model suggests that low income agents are less likely to buy health insurance
and so are low risk agents. This implies that the demand for health and health insurance changes
over the life-cycle. Individuals spend less and are less willing to buy health insurance at ages when
incomes and health risk are low.
In an extension, we explore the life-cycle behavior of health insurance choice and health spend-
ing in a more realistic multi-period overlapping generations model. Our full dynamic model also
accounts for general equilibrium channels such as equilibrium prices, interactions between health
insurance markets and other ﬁnancial markets, and tax ﬁnancing instruments. We calibrate our full
dynamic model to the U.S. economy. Our calibrated model with endogenous health accumulation
is capable to match the life-cycle trends of average medical expenditures and insurance take-up
2ratios from the MEPS data.
Next, we demonstrate how the model can be used to conduct health care policy analysis. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we apply our model to analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of a universal health insurance
voucher program that allows individuals to purchase health insurance from private insurance com-
panies with funds provided by the government. This voucher program would completely replace
Medicare and employer provided (tax free) health insurance. The voucher reform we have in mind
is motivated by the discussion in Kotlikoﬀ (2007) and Emanuel and Fuchs (2007) and is purely
counter factual. The plan works as follows. Each year an individual receives a voucher to purchase
insurance coverage from private insurance companies for the next year. The size of the voucher
is based on the individual’s current medical condition. The government runs an experience rating
system that estimates the expected health expenditure of an individual for the next period. The
government issues a voucher of that exact size to the individual. A sick person will therefore re-
ceive a larger voucher than a healthy person. Insurance companies compete for the vouchers of
patients. Participants can switch plans every year. The annual budget for health vouchers is ﬁxed
by the government as a share of GDP. Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-based health insurance
tax breaks are eliminated.1
We are interested in the policy question whether a universal public health insurance program
is able to increase the number of people with health insurance while simultaneously decreasing
aggregate health care spending. Our results from our ﬁrst experiment where we use a payroll tax
to ﬁnance the vouchers suggest that a voucher system would result in full coverage of the U.S.
population but also increases the share of GDP spent on health care by 0.6 percent. The main
driver behind the increase in health spending is a moral hazard eﬀect. Simultaneously, we observe
a certain amount of crowding out of savings that leads to lower long-run capital stocks. As GDP
falls the health expenditure to GDP ratio increases even further. We summarize these eﬀects under
the umbrella of negative eﬃciency eﬀects due to the publicly ﬁnanced voucher system. On the
other hand we also observe a complete disappearance of adverse selection eﬀects as insurance is
automatically available to the entire population. This leads to improvements in risk pooling and
higher levels of health. Since health is a consumption good, these eﬀects increase welfare. We
call these outcomes positive insurance eﬀects. Whichever of these two groups of eﬀects dominates,
will determine the welfare outcome for the entire economy. We ﬁnd that choosing the right tax
instruments to ﬁnance the vouchers will be critical in achieving positive welfare eﬀects for large
shares of the population. We ﬁnd that a payroll tax dominates a consumption and lump-sum tax
1Kotlikoﬀ (2007) attributes the idea to Economists Peter Ferrara at the Institute for Policy Innovation and
John Goodman, president of the National Center for Policy Analysis. An earlier contribution suggesting the use
of vouchers to reform Medicare is Butler, Moﬃt and Liu (1995). A World Bank publication, WorldBank (2005),
provides a summary of the mechanics of health care vouchers. The system proposed by Kotlikoﬀ (2007) is termed the
Medical Security System (MSS) and the system proposed by Emanuel and Fuchs (2007) is referred to as Universal
Healthcare Vouchers (UHV). The main diﬀerences between the MMS and the UHV are that
1. UHV do the experience rating at the level of the insurer or HMO, which still leaves some of the adverse
selection problems in the system.
2. UHV would maintain Medicare, which according to Kotlikoﬀ (2007) is not a viable option, since Medicare will
bankrupt the system eventually.
3in terms of welfare, but not in terms of eﬃciency.
We ﬁnd that voucher systems ﬁnanced by either a consumption or lump-sum tax lead to signi-
ﬁcant smaller decreases in aggregate capital stock that in the earlier experiment that used a payroll
tax to ﬁnance the vouchers. Meanwhile, aggregate consumption decreases by a full percentage point
more than under the payroll tax regime due to price substitution eﬀects. A higher consumption
tax increases the price of consumption and moves funds towards savings and medical expenditures.
Consequently, we ﬁnd that all generations born before and after the reform experience welfare
losses. These opposing results highlight the importance of modelling health insurance, medical
spending, and general equilibrium eﬀects together in order to comprehensively analyze health care
reform proposals. It also points to the fact that it will be crucial to ﬁnd the correct ﬁnancing
instrument for any such health care reform as diﬀerent taxes result in vastly diﬀerent outcomes.
Our work contributes directly to an emerging macro-health economics literature that connects
the literature analyzing health as an investment or consumption good as pioneered by Grossman
(1972b) with the literature on stochastic dynamic general equilibrium modelling (e.g. Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu and Jones (1995), Imrohoroglu (1998), and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009)). Recent
work by Suen (2006), Jung and Tran (2008), Halliday, He and Zhang (2009), and Feng (2009)
starts integrating health processes into more realistic life-cycle models for the U.S. These models
are primarily used to study policy reforms in realistic settings. However, these models often fall
short in: (i) integrating the demand for health care and health insurance with other aspects of the
household decision making process; (ii) taking into account life-cycle behavior of health spending
and health insurance; (iii) capturing interactions between public and private health insurance, and
interactions between insurance markets and other markets in the economy; and (iv) accounting for
important institutional details (e.g. tax sheltered employer provided health insurance) in the U.S.
health care and insurance sector. We advance this literature by addressing all these points in one
uniﬁed framework, where we account for an endogenous health accumulation process with health
risk, uncertainty about the availability of diﬀerent types of private insurance contracts, wage income
uncertainty, and public insurance programs like social security and Medicare. More importantly,
since we explicitly model the role of health we completely endogenize the households’ decision on
health expenditures and health insurance. Our model also captures the general equilibrium eﬀects
of public health insurance on the demand for private health insurance, precautionary savings and
health capital accumulation. Our paper is also connected to the literature on health insurance and
savings with exogenous health expenditure shocks (e.g. see Kotlikoﬀ (1988), Levin (1995), Hubbard,
Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Palumbo (1999), De Nardi, French and Jones (2009) and Jeske and
Kitao (2009)). Diﬀerent from these studies in our model health expenditures are endogenous and
determined together with health insurance and savings based on a utility maximization problem.
We also expand our own study on health savings accounts (Jung and Tran (2008)) by introducing
a more realistic insurance setting (group and individual insurance), income shocks, and transitions.
The latter enables us to perform a complete welfare analysis of the policy reforms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a simple two period version of
the model. Section 3 presents the fully dynamic model. In section 4 we present the calibration
4of the model. Section 5 contains the results of our policy experiments and section 6 concludes.
The appendix contains all tables and ﬁgures and equilibrium deﬁnitions. There is also a technical
appendix available on our website that contains the derivations of the welfare measures, solutions to
the simple model, and additional details about the model estimation parts using data from MEPS.2
2 A simple model
We start with a simple two period model with health risk and health insurance markets and
investigate how individuals deal with this type of risk and how government interventions aﬀect
the risk-sharing mechanism. As in any insurance market adverse selection and moral hazard will
play a role. However, in a multi-period setting with endogenous health this role is confounded with
savings eﬀects and human capital eﬀects that make the multi-period setting more intricate than
the simple one period settings of classical insurance papers like Pauly (1968).
We consider an overlapping generations economy where individuals live for two periods: young
and old. Every agent is born with income wi,which is drawn from a known distribution f (wi).
Agents will receive this income in period one and in period two. Young agents value utility from
consumption whereas old agents value utility from consumption and health status.3 In the second
period agents experience a health shock and health expenditures. A private health insurance market
is available to insure against such health shocks.
In the ﬁrst period, agents decide on how much to consume and save and on whether to purchase
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i is consumption when young; si is savings; ini ∈ {0,1} is the insurance state where ini = 0
indicates that no insurance is bought and ini = 1 indicates that the agent decided to buy insurance;
pi is the health insurance premium; wi is the individual income, and zi is the health shock when
old.
In the second period the agent derives utility from consumption co
i and health hi. The health
capital stock is determined by hi = g(zi,mi), where zi is an individual speciﬁc health shock when
old and mi is the amount of medical services consumed. We assume there are two possible health








i . With probability π the agent suﬀers a bad
health shock zB and with probability (1 − π) her health remains good zG. Let pm denote the price
of medical services. Total medical expenditure is pmmi. Total out-of-pocket spending on medical
treatments is denoted o(mi) which is a function of whether the agent bought insurance in the ﬁrst
2The technical appendix can be downloaded from: http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/healthvoucher111009supplement.pdf
3For simplicity, we assume that agents do not have any health problems when they are young, so that their utility





pmmi if uninsured, ini = 0,
ρ × pmmi if insured, ini = 1,
where the coinsurance rate ρ is the fraction that the household pays after the insurance pays
(1 − ρ) of total health expenditures. The agent then decides how much to spend on consumption
and medical treatments in the second period of her life as follows




i,hi) : s.t. co
i + o(mi) = Rsi + wiei, hi = g(zi,mi) and ei = f (hi).}
We assume a perfectly competitive insurance market, where insurance companies collect actuarially
fair premiums to cover their cost so that









We refer to this base model as our benchmark model.
In order to solve the model we assume that preferences follow u(cy) =
(cy)1−σ




1−σ when agents are young and old, respectively. The health production function is
linear g(zi,mi) = z×m and human capital is produced by f (hi) = hθ, where θ can either be 0 or 1.
In the ﬁrst case health is not productive and therefore only a consumption good and in the second
case health is productive and therefore also an investment good. Solving the household problem
we obtain the following solutions for agents buying insurance and agents not buying insurance.
We distinguish these agents according to superscript insi = {I or NI}, where I stands for agents
buying insurance and NI indicates agents that do not buy insurance. We assume that θ = 0 and
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with insi = {I or NI},
pins =
￿
p if buying insurance,







z if not insured.
Our simple model indicates that there are interactions between the decisions on consumption,
savings, insurance, and medical spending. We will discuss these interactions brieﬂy.
Health insurance vs. precautionary savings. Individuals face health risk and have two
options to insure themselves: private savings (or self-insurance) and private health insurance. The
4We provide details to the solution in a technical appendix on our website.
6existence of private health insurance has two opposing eﬀects on individuals’ welfare. Insurance
provides a risk sharing mechanism, which is welfare improving. On other hand, insurance contracts
are costly to obtain and may therefore lower welfare due to a negative income eﬀect that lowers
consumption and savings when young. Let V I and V NI be the value functions of an agent buying
insurance and of an agent not buying insurance, respectively. An agent will demand health insurance
as long as V I ≥ V NI. More speciﬁcally, for each individual i there exists a maximum willingness
to pay for insurance p∗
i. If the market premium for insurance p ≤ p∗
i then individual i will buy the
insurance.
The maximum willingness to pay p∗
i depends on the curvature of the value function (i.e. the
individual’s risk aversion) and the individual’s income endowment wi. We ﬁnd that the willingness
to pay for insurance is an increasing function in income due to the dynamic structure of the
model.5 The intuition is as follows. Since the marginal utility of consumption when young is
higher for the poor agents than it is for rich, the utility cost of buying health insurance in terms
of forgone consumption is much higher. For a given distribution of income, there is a distribution
of willingness to buy health insurance. Given a positive insurance premium there will be some
agents who optimally choose not to buy insurance and rely on precautionary savings only as their
maximum willingness is lower than the premium. Low income agents are less likely to buy health
insurance. This implies that over the life-cycle, individuals are less willing to buy health insurance
at ages when incomes are low.
As established in previous studies, the presence of health risk and health expenditure uncertainty
increases precautionary savings and the demand for health insurance (e.g. see Kotlikoﬀ (1988),
Levin (1995), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Palumbo (1999)). In our model, the demand
for health insurance crowds out savings as demonstrated in equation (1). That is, if individuals buy
insurance contracts in the private market, they have to give up part of their income when young
to pay the market insurance premium p, which directly lowers income and therefore savings. This
result is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999).
When assuming that individuals face idiosyncratic (bad) health shocks with probability π, the
classic issue of adverse selection in insurance markets appears (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
High risk agents beneﬁt more from buying health insurance and therefore are more willing to buy
health insurance while the low risk agents opt out. When insurance companies are not allowed to
charge individual speciﬁc premiums they have to charge an average premium to everybody and will
end up attracting a pool of high risk agents. Consequently, low risk agents self insure via private
savings. Therefore young individuals with low health risk are less likely to buy health insurance.
Insurance contract and health expenditure. The existence of a health insurance market
aﬀects an individuals’ health expenditure. Insured agents tend to spend more on medical services
due to a price substitution eﬀect (moral hazard). Our model captures this channel in equation
(2). Individuals consume more medical services
∂mins
i
∂ph < 0 as they face a lower eﬀective price of
medical service ph. In addition, our model links the choice on health spending with the dynamic
5A formal proof is available upon request from the authors. In one shot games larger wealth levels decrease the
risk premium, so that the willingness to pay for insurance is actually decreasing in income in such environments.
7consumption/savings problem. When an agent decides to buy health insurance, the agent saves
less when young sI < sNI, which leads to lower savings/interest income when old. Subsequently,
due to this income eﬀect or “savings eﬀect”, insured agents have less money available to buy health
services. However, they are eligible to pay the cheaper price for health services in their second period
when the insurance becomes eﬀective. The net eﬀect determines whether medical expenditures will
increase or decrease. If the substitution eﬀect is dominant, agents will spend more on medical
services in this multi-period setting.
Trade-oﬀs in public health insurance. When private insurance markets fail to provide
insurance to all individuals due to adverse selection, the introduction of a universal health insurance
voucher program could be welfare improving as it alleviates a market failure. Like any other publicly
run program, health insurance vouchers should be evaluated in the context of the trade-oﬀ between
insurance (equity) and incentives (eﬃciency). Equity implies a more equal income distribution
while eﬃciency implies minimization of distortionary eﬀects of public health insurance on private
insurance choice, health spending, and savings behavior. The existence of this new risk sharing
arrangement fundamentally aﬀects individuals’ savings, insurance decisions and health spending
and also has impacts on the market equilibrium. On one hand, a universal health insurance voucher
system creates incentives for all individuals to buy health insurance and therefore oﬀers a possible
solution for the coverage problem (insurance). On the other hand, the voucher system carries
an inherent incentive problem as it discourages individuals from saving while it also encourages
increased spending on health care. The later increases the adverse eﬀects of moral hazard in
private health insurance markets and leads to additional eﬃciency loss (incentives). A good public
health insurance program should eﬃciently trade oﬀ insurance and incentives.
Health and labor productivity. That new risk-sharing arrangement aﬀects the market
equilibrium and prices, which in turn aﬀects the demand for health care and health capital accu-
mulation. If health is associated with labor productivity then spending on health is an investment
good as argued in Grossman (1972b). The voucher program would therefore directly aﬀect the
formation of human capital and inﬂuence the overall eﬃciency of the economy. In our model we
can “turn on” the human capital channel by setting parameter θ = 1. The demand for health and









































Comparing medical spending (3) to medical spending without the human capital eﬀect of health
(2) we see that mins
i (θ = 1) > mins
i (θ = 0). In other words, when health is an investment good
(in addition to also being a consumption good), then agents have more incentive to spend higher
8amounts of medical services and to accumulate more health capital. The new term [−wi] in the
demand equations above captures the additional margin.
Equation (4) indicates how health insurance inﬂuences health capital accumulation. Uninsured
agents accumulate less health capital hins
i > hnoins
i as they have to pay higher prices for medical
services pins
h < pnoins
h . In an economy where insurance markets are incomplete, under-investment in
health capital could exist for uninsured agents. In such an economy, public intervention to expand
health insurance coverage could result in eﬃciency gains. This channel also inﬂuences the trade-
oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency and has implications for welfare. Accounting for this channel is
important to judge whether the health insurance voucher program could be a good replacement for
the current system.
General equilibrium eﬀects. In a general equilibrium framework, the new risk-sharing
arrangement aﬀects the intertemporal allocation of funds, which in turn determines equilibrium
market prices such as the wage rate w, interest rates r, and insurance premiums p. Prices feed back
on the individual’s insurance choice and health spending. The tax ﬁnancing instruments that are
used to ﬁnance the voucher program also aﬀect general equilibrium outcomes. The ﬁnal eﬀects on
coverage, medical expenditure, and welfare depend on how these general equilibrium mechanisms
play out. In the next section, we therefore develop a full general equilibrium model to explore the
full eﬀects of the introduction of health insurance vouchers into the current U.S. health insurance
system.
3 Fully dynamic model6
3.1 Demographics
We use an overlapping generations framework. Agents work for J1 periods and then retire for J−J1
periods. In each period there is an exogenous survival probability of cohort j which we denote πj.
Agents die for sure after J periods. Deceased agents leave an accidental bequest that is taxed and
redistributed equally to all agents alive. The population grows exogenously at an annual net rate
n. We assume stable demographic patterns, so that age j agents make up a constant fraction µj of
the entire population at any point in time. The relative sizes of the cohorts alive µj and the mass













where years denotes the number of years modelled for each agent.
6In the current version of the model we abstract from modelling competition in health insurance markets. Our
model is therefore not able to capture potential eﬃciency gains of the voucher system due to increased competition in
private health insurance markets. Second, we also do not model the eﬀects of private insurance companies monitoring
health care providers and potential gains from increased monitoring due to vouchers. However, there is some evidence
pointing to only very small cost savings eﬀects due to increased competition (e.g. Medicare advantage plans were
introduced with a similar goal in mind. Cost containments were however not realized.).
93.2 Technology and ﬁrms
In this economy, there is a continuum of identical ﬁrms that use physical capital K and human
capital L to produce one type of ﬁnal good. The ﬁnal good can be used as either a consumption
good c or as medical services m. We do not model the production of medical services m separately.
The price of consumption goods is normalized to one and the price of medical services is denoted
pm. Each unit of consumption good can be traded for 1
pm units of medical services. Firms choose
physical capital K and human capital L to solve the following proﬁt maximization problem
max
{K, L}
{F (K,L) − qK − wL}, (5)
taking the rental rate of capital q and the wage rate w as given. Capital depreciates at rate δ in
each period.
3.3 Preferences
Households value consumption c and services s that are derived from health h. Household prefer-
ences are described by a utility function u(c,s) where u : R2 → R is C2 and satisﬁes the standard
Inada conditions. We assume the following technology for the production of health services that
transfers health capital from the current period into health services in the current period,
s = f (h),
where f￿ ≥ 0 and f￿￿ ≤ 0.
3.4 Health and human capital accumulation
Health and human capital evolve over the lifetime of an agent and depend on the agents investment
into health.
Health capital accumulation. Agents produce health capital via investments into health
denoted as medical expenditure m. We follow Grossman (1972b) and use the following accumulation
process for health capital
hj = i(mj,hj−1,εj), (6)
where hj denotes the current health capital (or health status), hj−1 denotes last period’s health
capital, mj is amount of medical services bought in the current period, and εj is an exogenous
health shock. Health capital depreciates at rate δh (j) which is a function of age. The older the
agent becomes the faster her health depreciates. Finally, the exogenous health shock εj follows a
Markov process with transition matrix P. Transition probabilities to the next health state depend
on the current health shock εj so that an element of transition matrix Pj is deﬁned as
pεj+1,εj = Pr(εj+1|εj,j).
10Human capital accumulation. The endowment process is deﬁned by human capital proﬁle
e(j,hj−1,.j) which depends on age j, health status at the beginning of the current period hj−1,
and working ability .j. Let
π￿j+1,￿j = Pr(.j+1|.j,j)
be the conditional probability for age j + 1 working ability being .j+1 when age j working ability
is .j. We summarize all such probabilities in Markov matrix Πj.
3.5 Health expenditures and insurance arrangements
In our benchmark model, agents can buy medical services to improve their health capital. The
total health expenditure that agents have to pay to improve their health capital is pmmj where pm
is the price of medical services. Since health shocks are age-dependent and stochastic, total health
expenditures are stochastic.7 To cover their health care cost, agents can buy an insurance contract.
We assume that there are two separate insurance arrangements: private health insurance markets
for workers and Medicare for retirees.
Private health insurance for workers. Working agents have two types of health insurance
policies available: individual insurance and group insurance. In order to be covered by insurance,
agents have to buy insurance one period prior to the realization of their health shock. The insurance
policy will become active in the following period (one period contract). Agents in their ﬁrst period
of life are thus not covered by any insurance by construction. We distinguish between three possible
insurance states and use insurance state variable inj to indicate what type of health insurance an
agent has bought in the previous period, where inj = 0 indicates no insurance, inj = 1 indicates
individual insurance, and inj = 2 stands for group insurance.
We also assume that each period an agent has a certain probability to be matched with an
employer that provides group insurance which is indicated with indicator variable iGI = 1. If
an employer provides group insurance the insurance premium p is tax deductible and insurance
companies are not allowed to screen workers. If a worker is not oﬀered group insurance from the
employer, iGI = 0, then the worker has the option to buy health insurance in the individual market
at premium p(j,h). In this case the insurance premium is not tax deductible and the insurance
company screens the worker by age and health status. The probability of being oﬀered group
insurance is highly correlated with income, so that the Markov process that governs the group
insurance oﬀer probability will be a function of the income class. Let
ωj+1,j = Pr(iGI,j+1|iGI,j,income)
be the conditional probability that an agent has group insurance status iGI,j+1 in period j+1 given
7Note that we only model discretionary health expenditures pmmj in this paper so that income will have a strong
eﬀect on endogenous total medical expenses. Our setup assumes that given the same magnitude of health shock
εj, a richer individual will outspend a poor individual. This may be realistic in some circumstances, however, a
large fraction of health expenditures in the U.S. are probably non-discretionary (e.g. health expenditures caused by
catastrophic health events that require surgery etc.). In such cases a poor individual could still incur large health
care costs. We do not cover this case in the current model.
11she had group insurance status iGI,j in period j. We collect all conditional probabilities for group
insurance status in transition matrix Ωincome which has dimension 2 × 2 for each income quantile.




min[pm,Insmj,γ + ρ(pm,Insmj − γ)]
if inj = 0, (no insurance)
if inj = 1,2 (individual/group insurance)
(7)
where γ is the deductible, ρ is the coinsurance rate, pm,Ins is the relative price of health expenditures
paid by insured workers, and pm,noIns is the price of health expenditures paid by uninsured workers.
An uninsured worker pays a higher price pm,noIns > pm,Ins. The coinsurance rate ρ is the fraction
that the household pays after the insurance company pays (1 − ρ) of the post deductible amount
pm,Insmj −γ. Since households have to buy insurance before health shocks are revealed we assume
that working households in their last period j = J1 already decide to buy into Medicare (e.g.
Medicare Plan B premiums).
Medicare. After retirement all agents are covered by Medicare. The medicare deductible is
denoted γMed. Medicare pays a ﬁxed proportion
￿
1 − ρMed￿
of the post deductible amount of health
expenditures. The total out of pocket health expenditures of a retiree are






, if j > J1 + 1, (8)
where pm,Med is the price of health services that retirees with Medicare have to pay. Agents have
to pay a Medicare Plan B premium pMed. We assume that old agents j > J1 + 1 do not purchase
private health insurance.8
Private health insurance companies. Insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint
within each period and we allow for cross subsidizing across generations. The constraints are




























8According to the Medical Expendiure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2001, only 15% of total health expenditures of
individuals older than 65 are covered by supplementary insurances. Cutler and Wise (2003) report that 97% of
people above age 65 are enrolled in Medicare which covers 56% of their total health expenditures. Medicare Plan
B requires the payment of a monthly premium and a yearly deductible. See Medicare and You (2007) for a brief
summary of Medicare.
12where ω is a markup factor that determines the proﬁt of the insurance company, 1{inj(xj)=1} is an
indicator function equal to unity whenever agents bought the individual health insurance policy,
1{inj(xj)=2} is an indicator function equal to unity whenever agents bought the group insurance
policy, R is the market after tax interest rate, and xj is a summary vector of states for every agent
that will be described later. Proﬁts are redistributed in equal amounts to all surviving agents.
Alternatively, we could discard the proﬁts (“thrown in the ocean”) in which case we could think of
them as loading costs (ﬁxed costs) associated with running private insurance companies.
3.6 Government
The government taxes current workers via a payroll tax and charges Medicare plan B premiums to
























In addition, the government runs a PAYG Social Security program which is self-ﬁnanced via a














Finally, the government taxes consumption at rate τC and income (i.e. wages, interest income,
interest on bequests) at a progressive tax rate ˜ τ (˜ yj) which is a function of taxable income ˜ y
and ﬁnances a social insurance program TSI (e.g. foodstamps) as well as exogenous government
















Government spending G plays no further role. Accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-sum










˜ µjaj (xj)dΛ(xj), (14)
where ˜ µj denotes the deceased mass of agents aged j in time t. An equivalent notation applies for
the surviving population of workers and retirees denoted µj.
3.7 Household problem
Age j year old agents enter the period with state vector xj = (aj,hj,inj,εj,.j,iGI), where aj
is the capital stock at the beginning of the period, hj−1 is the health state at beginning of the
period, inj is the insurance state at the beginning of the period, εj is a negative health shock, .j
13is positive income shock, and iGI indicates whether group insurance from the employer is available
for purchase in this period. Old agents, j > J1 are retired. They do not experience an income
shock anymore and they are assumed to be covered by Medicare. The state vector of a household
of age j can be summarized as
xj =
￿
(aj,hj−1,inj,εj,.j,iGI,j) ∈ R+ × R+ × {0,1,2} × R− × R+ × {0,1} = DW for j ≤ J1,




DW for j ≤ J1,
DR for j > J1.
For each xj ∈ D(xj) let Λ(xj) denote the measure of age j agents with xj ∈ D. The fraction
µjΛ(xj) then denotes the measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ D with respect to the entire population
of agents in the economy.
3.7.1 Workers
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that they supply inelastically to the labor market.
Agents therefore receive income in the form of wages, interest income, accidental bequests, and
social insurance. The latter guarantees a minimum consumption level of c. After health shocks are
realized, agents simultaneously decide their consumption cj, stocks of capital for the next period
aj+1, and health service expenditures mj. Depending on the realization of the group insurance oﬀer
state iGI, an agent chooses the insurance state for the next period.
If the agent is oﬀered group insurance then the agent can choose between inj+1 = {0,1,2},
paying premiums of zero, p(j,h) for individual insurance and premium p for group insurance,
respectively. If the agent is not oﬀered group insurance, that is iGI,j = 0, then her choice for
next period’s health insurance is reduced to inj+1 = {0,1}. The household problem for workers
j = {1,...,J1 − 1} can be formulated recursively as
V (xj) = max
{cj,mj,aj+1,inj+1}
￿





cj + (1 + g)aj+1 + oW (mj) + 1{inj+1=1}p(j,h) + 1{inj+1=2}p
= we(j,hj,.) + R
￿
aj + TBeq￿































0,c + Taxj − we(j,hj,.) − R
￿
aj + TBeq￿
− InsP1 − InsP2
￿
.
Variable cj is consumption, aj+1 is next period’s capital stock9, g is the exogenous growth rate,
oW (mj) is out-of-pocket health expenditure, mj is total health expenditure, R is the gross interest
rate paid on assets aj from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq
j , Taxj is total taxes
paid10 and TSI
j is Social Insurance (e.g. food stamp programs).





is the income tax, and ˜ yW
j is the tax base for the
income tax composed of wage income and interest income on assets, interest earned on accidental
bequests, and proﬁts from insurance companies minus the employee share of payroll taxes and the
premium for health insurance.11
The Social Insurance program TSI
j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social Insur-
ance is paid out then automatically aj+1 = 0 and inj = 0 (the no insurance state) so that Social
Insurance cannot be used to ﬁnance savings and private health insurance.12 Agents can only buy
9Agents are borrowing constrained, in the sense that that aj+1 ≥ 0. Borrowing constraints can either be modeled
as a wedge between the interest rates on borrowing and lending, or a threshold on the minimum asset position. See
also Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) for a further discussion.
10If health insurance was provided by the employer, so that premiums would be partly paid for by the employer,
then the tax function would change to












˜ wj − 1{inj=2} (1 − ψ)p
￿
,
where ψ is the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer. Jeske and Kitao (2009) use a similar formulation
to model private vs. employer provided health insurance. We simplify this aspect of the model and assume that all
group health insurance policies are oﬀered via the employer but that the employee pays the entire premium, so that
ψ = 0. The premium is therefore tax deductible in the employee (or household) budget constraint.
We allow for income tax deductibility of insurance premiums due to IRC provision 125 (Cafeteria Plans) that
allow employers to set up tax free accounts for their employees in order to pay qualiﬁed health expenses but also the
employee share of health insurance premiums.
11We assume that only interest earned on bequests are taxed. The U.S. income tax code contains many provisions
that allow for the exclusion of bequests from income taxes.
12The stipulations for Medicaid eligibility encompass maximum income levels but also maximum wealth levels.
Some individuals who fail to be classiﬁed as ’categorically needy’ because they have to much savings could still be
eligibile as ’medically needy’ (e.g. caretaker relatives, aged persons older than 65, blind individuals, etc.)
We will therefore make the simplifying assumption that before the Social Insurance program kicks in the
individual has to use up all her wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2005) follows a similar approach. See also:
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility
for details on Medicaid eligibility.
15individual or group insurance if they have suﬃcient funds to do so, that is whenever






− oW (mj) − Taxj,






− oW (mj) − Taxj.
The social insurance program will not pay for their health insurance. In their last working period,
workers will not buy private insurance anymore because they become eligible for Medicare when
retired.
3.7.2 Retirees
Retired agents are insured under Medicare and by deﬁnition do not buy any more private health
insurance. The household problem for a retired agent j ≥ J1 + 1 can be formulated recursively as
V (xj) = max
{cj,mj,aj+1}
￿








































Note that retired agents cannot buy private health insurance anymore so that inj+1 = 0 by deﬁni-
tion.
3.8 Health insurance vouchers
In our alternative regime, Medicare is eliminated and the government runs a health insurance
voucher program, instead. Households receive a health voucher each period that they can use to
buy their basic health insurance coverage. The amount of the voucher depends on the discounted
(and mortality adjusted) expected health expenditure of the agent in the next period. We can
therefore write the size of the voucher for each agent as a function of the agent state vector xj
v(xj) = p(xj) = πjEεj+1,￿j+1|εj,￿j [(1 − ρ)max(0, pm,Insmj+1 (xj+1) − γ)].
163.8.1 Insurance company
In the model with health vouchers, insurance companies are allowed to charge idiosyncratic premi-
ums that are equal to the expected health spending of the agent in the next period. This premium
can be written as
pj (xj) = πj × E [(1 − ρ)max(0,pm,Insmj+1 (xj+1) − γ)].
Since premiums pj are paid for by vouchers from the government and the size of the vouchers is
equal to the expected future health expenditure of the agent, it has to hold that
pj (xj) = v(xj).
Again, insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint within each period. We allow for cross
subsidizing across generations.










where ω is a markup factor that determines the proﬁt (or loading costs) of the insurance company.
We do not model the possible premium reductions from increased competition due to vouchers
but instead assume a perfectly competitive insurance market where insurance companies make zero
proﬁt. This will underestimate the eﬀects of vouchers on the reduction of insurance premiums and
the reduction of health expenditures in general. However, some literature on competition in health
insurance and health care markets questions the beneﬁcial eﬀects of increased competition on welfare
and health care quality (e.g. Frank and Lamiroud (2008), Gaynor (2006), DeFeo and Hindriks
(2005), Bundorf (2003), Cutler and Reber (1998)). We therefore assume that the additional cost
savings or price reduction eﬀects from vouchers due to increased competition in health insurance
markets are small and hence not crucial for our analysis.
3.8.2 Government








[(1 − ρ)max(0, pm,Insmj+1 (xj+1) − γ)]dΛ(xj). (18)
We assume that vouchers are ﬁnanced either by a payroll tax τV , a sales tax on ﬁnal goods con-
sumption τC, or a lump-sum tax τLS. The government budget constraint for the voucher regimes










































Taxj (xj) + τLS￿
dΛ(xj). (21)
3.8.3 Household
Age j year old agents enter the period with state vector xj = (aj,hj,εj,.j), where aj is the capital
stock at the beginning of the period, hj−1 is the health state at beginning of the period, εj is a
negative health shock, and .j is positive income shock. The state vector of a household of age j
can be summarized as
xj =
￿
(aj,hj−1,εj,.j) ∈ R+ × R+ × R− × R+ = D.
For each xj ∈ D(xj) let Λ(xj) denote the measure of age j agents with xj ∈ D. The fraction
µjΛ(xj) then denotes the measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ D with respect to the entire population
of agents in the economy.
Workers. The worker’s dynamic programming problem is given by
V (xj) = max
{cj,mj,aj+1}
￿





cj + (1 + g)aj+1 + oW (mj) + p(xj)
=
￿




− Taxj + TSI






















Variable cj is consumption, aj+1 is next period’s capital stock, g is the exogenous growth rate,
oW (mj) is out-of-pocket health expenditure, mj is total health expenditure, p(xj) is the insurance
premium, R is the gross interest rate paid on assets aj from the previous period and accidental
18bequests T
Beq
j , Taxj is total taxes paid, TSI
j is Social Insurance (e.g. food stamp programs), τC is
a consumption tax, τV is special payroll tax, and τLS is a special lump sum tax. Either τC, τV , or
τLS will be active to ﬁnance the voucher program.





captures progressive income tax, τSocwe(j,hj,.)
is the payroll tax that the household pays for Social Security, and ˜ yW
j is the tax base for the income
tax composed of wage income and interest income on assets and accidental bequests. The Social
Insurance program TSI
j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social Insurance is paid out
then automatically aj+1 = 0.
Retirees. Retired agents are similar to working agents except they lack the working income
and are thus not exposed to the income shock. In addition they receive pension payments. They
are not enrolled in Medicare anymore.
4 Parameterization and estimation
We provide deﬁnitions of a competitive equilibrium of the benchmark model and the model with
vouchers in the appendix. We use a standard numeric algorithm to solve the model.13
We distinguish two sets of parameters. The ﬁrst set is estimated independently from our model
and based on either our own estimates using data from MEPS or estimates provided by other
studies (Table 1). The second set of free parameters is chosen so that model-generated data match
a given set of targets (Table 2). We present the target moments that we match with our model in
table 3.
4.1 Demographics
One period is deﬁned as 5 years. We model households from age 20 to age 90 which results in
J = 14 periods. The annual conditional survival probabilities are taken from U.S. Life-Tables in
2003 and adjusted for period length.14 The population growth rate for the U.S. was 1.2 percent on
average from 1950 to 1997 according to the of Economic Advisors (1998). In the model the total
population over the age of 65 is 17.35 percent which is very close to the fraction of 17.4 percent in
the Census.
4.2 Technology and ﬁrms
We impose a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology,
F (K,L) = AKαL1−α,
and choose a capital share of α = 0.36 which is a standard value. In our model we pick a capital
depreciation rate of δ = 15 percent which is close to standard values in the calibration literature
13We discuss the algorithm in the technical appendix, which is available on the authors’ website at
http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/healthvoucher111009supplement.pdf
14ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/NVSR/54_14/Table01.xls
19(e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982)). The depreciation per period is then 1 − (1 − δ)(years/J).
4.3 Preferences






where η is the intensity parameter of consumption, and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal rate
of substitution (or relative risk aversion parameter). We set σ = 2.5 and η = 0.9. In conjunction
with the magnitudes of the health shocks this weight ensures that the model matches total health
spending and the take-up ratio of health insurance of the diﬀerent age groups. In addition we
assume that health services are produced according to
s = f (h) = h.
The annual discount factor β is picked to match the capital output ratio and the interest rate.
It is understood that in a general equilibrium model every parameter aﬀects all equilibrium vari-
ables. Here we associate parameters with those equilibrium variables that are the most directly
(quantitatively) aﬀected.
4.4 Health and the human capital accumulation
The period’s health state is produced according to
hj = i(mj,hj−1,εj) = φm
ξ
j + (1 − δj)hj−1 + εj.
The productivity parameter φ of the health production function is normalized to unity. This is
similar to the production parameter in Suen (2006) for a very similar production function of health.
In addition, Grossman (1972a) and Stratmann (1999) estimate positive eﬀects of medical services
on measures of health outcomes. We set ξ = 0.32. We do not have data on these parameters,
however these parameters are important in targeting total aggregate health expenditure and the
expenditure proﬁle over age, so that we get a good idea about their magnitude by matching the
model generated moments to aggregate data.






term in brackets is the marginal contribution to health of an additional unit of health care.15
We assume that health depreciates depending on age so that the depreciation rates vary between
δj=1 = 0.06 and δj=J = 0.52. These are health depreciation rates over 5 year periods. This choice
ensures that health depreciates faster as the agent ages. Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St-Amour (2009)
estimate depreciation rates of 0.176 per year, which translates into a ﬁve year depreciation rate of
1 − (1 − 0.176)
5 = 0.6211. Their estimate is based on individuals older than 65.
15Compare Suen (2006) for a similar formulation.
204.4.1 Transition probabilities
The Markov transition probabilities for income shocks and group health insurance oﬀers are es-
timated with data from MEPS 2004 and 2005. We estimate eﬃciency proﬁles for separate income
quantiles and then calculate the transition probabilities of going from one quantile to another con-
ditioning on the age of the worker. We then get estimates for age dependent Markov matrices Πj
where j = {1,...,J1}. Jung and Tran (2009) contains the details of the estimation procedure as
well as the tables with the estimates.
MEPS data also contains information about whether agents have received a group health in-
surance oﬀer from their employer. We found that these oﬀers are highly correlated with income so
that we estimate the transition probability matrices conditional on the respective income quantile
of the agents, which results in matrices Ωincome. Again, Jung and Tran (2009) contains the details.
Finally, we chose the Markov transition matrix for health shocks P (εj,εj−1) to match aggregate
health service expenditure as well as average insurance pickup rates over the agents’ life cycle. The
transition probabilities range from











4.4.2 Magnitude of health shocks
We chose the magnitude of the health shocks ε = {0.01, 0.91} to match the insurance coverage
take-up rate (percentage of workers buying health insurance per age group) and the share of medical
spending in GDP.
4.4.3 Human capital proﬁle








for j = {1,...,J1}, (23)
where .j is working productivity estimated from MEPS 2004-2005 data for separate income quantiles,
χ ∈ [0,1], and θ ≥ 0. This formulation mimics the hump-shaped income process over the life-cycle
and makes the wage income of agents dependent on their health state. An otherwise identical
individual will be more productive and have higher income if she has relatively better health (e.g.
fewer sick days, better career advancement of healthy individuals, etc.).
Tuning parameter θ allows us to gradually diminish the inﬂuence of health on the production
process while holding the exogenous age dependent component ﬁxed. This parameter determines
to what degree health is an investment good. If θ = 0 then health is a consumption good only.
After taking the endogenous health capital into account, the model reproduces the hump shaped
average eﬃciency units of the human capital proﬁle. We normalized the proﬁle and compare it to
the normalized income proﬁle from the data. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) show similar
income patterns using data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey over the period 1980-1998.
21For parameter χ we pick 0.9. We are not aware of any estimates for parameter χ and will
therefore conduct sensitivity analysis. We then use parameter θ to determine the degree of the
investment good function of health. A parameter θ = 0 indicates that health is a pure consumption
good and as such unproductive and θ = 1 indicates that health is also an investment good with
strong eﬀects on the formation of human capital.
4.5 Health insurance markets
4.5.1 Insurance premiums, deductibles and coinsurance rates
Insurance premiums in the individual markets are dependent on age and the health status. Age
is highly correlated with health. We therefore simplify the analysis and assume that insurance
companies in the individual market will price discriminate according to age only. We then use
a base premium p0 and exogenous markups for age. Base premiums p0 will adjust to clear the
insurance companies budget constraint (9). We use data on average premiums provided in The
Cost and Beneﬁt of Individual Health Insurance Plans (2005) and estimate the exogenous age
dependent premium growth rate gj according to
gage = x0 + x1 × age + x2 × age2 + uage, (24)
where uage is an iid random variable with E [uage|age] = 0. The insurance premium is then the
base premium times the growth rate, or
p(j) = p0 × gj,for all j ∈ {1,...,J1}. (25)
We pick coinsurance rate ρ = 34 percent (Suen (2006) uses a coinsurance rate of 25 percent).
Deductibles are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of median income. We
impose that the deductible for private health insurance is 1.7 percent of median income. We also
relate the private insurance premiums to premiums from Medicare Plan B according to Claxton,
Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder, DiJulio and Hawkins (2006). These parameters result in
insurance premiums that are close to the average insurance premium as a fraction of income in the
data. All ratios, data and model generated, are reported in table 3.
4.5.2 Price of medical services
In order to pin down the relative price of consumption goods vs. medical services, we use the
average ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) and the Medical CPI between 1992 and 2006.
We calculate the relative price to be pm = 1.15.16
The price of medical services for uninsured agents is higher than for insured agents. Various
studies have pointed to the fact that uninsured individuals pay up to 50 percent (and more) higher
prices for prescription drugs as well as hospital services (see Playing Fair, State Action to Lower
16Compare: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu
22Prescription Drug Prices (2000)). The national average is a markup of around 60 percent for the
uninsured population (Brown (2006)). We therefore pick pm,nIns = 1.55.
4.6 Government
Social security taxes are τSoc = 12.4 percent on earnings up to $97,500. This contribution is made
by both employee and employer. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Security tax rate is a little
lower at 10.6 percent and has been used by Jeske and Kitao (2009) in a similar calibration. We
therefore match τSoc at 10.6 percent picking the appropriate pension replacement ratio Ψ to be 45
percent.17 The size of the social security program is then 6 percent of GDP. This is close to the
number reported in The 2002 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2002) which is 5 percent for 2002.
The Medicare tax τMed adjusts to clear expression (11). We ﬁx the premium for Medicare
pMed so that premium payments are 1 percent of GDP. The model then results in a Medicare
size of 2.08 percent of GDP which is close to the 2.5 percent reported in 2002 Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical
Insurance Trust Funds (2002) with a Medicare payroll tax of 2.1 percent. Medicare payroll taxes
are 2×1.45 percent on all earnings split in employer and employee contributions(see Social Security
Update 2007 (2007)).
Using the income tax rates of the U.S. income tax of 2005 we follow Guner, Kaygusuz and
Ventura (2007) and estimate the following equation describing marginal income tax rates
margTax(income) = β0 + β1 log(income) + uincome, (26)
where margTax(income) is the marginal tax rate that applies when taxable income equals income,
and ε is an iid random variable where uincome is an iid random variable with E [uincome|income] =
0. Variable income is household income normalized with an assumed maximum income level of
$400,000. We then ﬁt equation (26) to the normalized income data. The estimated coeﬃcients for
the tax function are then ˆ β0 = 0.3411 and ˆ β1 = 0.0659 so that the income tax function becomes
T (taxable income) = margTax(income) × taxable income, (27)
where T (taxable income) is total income tax paid. In addition, we impose a lower bound of 0
percent and an upper bound of 35 percent on the marginal income tax rate. In our model, we
similarly normalize taxable income of every agent with the maximum income of the richest agent
in the economy to get the normalized variable income. We use this normalized income directly
in expression (27) to get the marginal tax rate and the sum total of payable income tax for each
17Social security transfers are deﬁned as T
Soc
j (x) = Ψwej (hj−1) and they are the same for all agents. Transfers
are a function of the active wage of a worker in her last period of work, so that j = J1. In addition we assume that
hj−1 is a constant and the same for all agents. We pick it to be equal
h0,J1+hggridh,J1
2 , which is the “middle” health
state of the health grid vector. Biggs, Brown and Springstead (2005) report a 45% replacement rate for the average
worker in the U.S. and Whitehouse (2003) ﬁnds similar rates for OECD countries.
23individual.18
Since income tax revenue and consumption tax revenue is collected to pay for the social insurance
program TSI (e.g. foodstamps, etc.) and the residual becomes government consumption G, we
want to make sure that the size of government consumption also conforms to the data (G/Y = 18
percent as reported in Jeske and Kitao (2009), or 20 percent reported in Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez
and Rios-Rull (2003)) which results in a consumption tax τc = 7 percent (Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1994) reports 5.67 percent). The social insurance program ﬁnances minimum consumption
c at 9.8 percent of median income (Jeske and Kitao (2009) use 23.9 percent of average earnings).
We ﬁx the Medicare coinsurance rate at 30 percent. According to Medicare News from November
2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the Outpatient Prospective Payment System
(OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital’s total payment. Overall, average beneﬁciary
copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in 2005 to
29% in 2006.19
Deductibles are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of average health ex-
penditure. We impose that the Medicare deductible is γMed = 6 percent of median income.
4.7 Key calibration results
In general we calibrate our model to match U.S. data from MEPS in 2004/2005 unless we indicate
another data source. We match several important features of the data including insurance coverage,
medical expenditures, and wealth accumulation over the life-cycle.
Number of Insured Workers and Life-Cycle Take-up Ratio. Panel one in ﬁgure 2 shows
the fraction of insured agents over the life-cycle. We present both insurance take up ratios from
the data and from the model. We see that the model slightly overestimates the take up rate of
insurance for young workers and underestimates the take-up rate for older workers. Overall, the
model generates take up rates over the life-cycle that are very close to the data.
Life-Cycle Medical Expenditures. We match two important measures of medical expendit-
ures; the share of medical spending as a fraction of GDP and life-cycle medical expenditures as
fraction of income. First, our model generates total medical expenditures of 10 percent in terms
of GDP, which is lower than the reported range of 15 to 17 percent of GDP for the US in 2005
according to Baicker (2006) and Fang and Gavazza (2007). We think this lower number is justiﬁed
as we concentrate our analysis on the 20 to 85 year old population which leaves out health care
spending for children and teenagers. In addition, we do not model Medicaid. Second, our model
also matches the life-cycle pattern of medical expenditure as a fraction of income, which is an
increasing function in age (panel two in ﬁgure 2).
Life-Cycle Wealth. Panel two in ﬁgure 2 shows the asset distribution over various age groups.
18Another method is to use the tax function estimated in Miguel and Strauss (1994).
19According to Medicare News from November 2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the Outpatient
Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital’s total payment. Overall, average
beneﬁciary copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in 2005 to 29% in
2006.
Visit: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1506
24We see that the model reproduces the hump shaped pattern in the data. The data is from the U.S.
Census in 2000.
5 Policy experiments and results
After calibrating the model to its initial steady state (see ﬁrst column in table 4) we introduce a
universal health insurance voucher program that insures all workers and also replaces Medicare. In
our ﬁrst experiment we use a payroll tax to ﬁnance the voucher program, the program is denoted
Regime 1 in table 4. We ﬁnd that the introduction of health insurance vouchers together with the
elimination of Medicare results in a number of important general equilibrium eﬀects.
Eﬃciency loss. This universal public health insurance program results in eﬃciency loss. That
is, aggregate capital is reduced by 11 percent and subsequently output is lowered by 3.8 percent.
The decline in capital accumulation is mainly due to disincentives on savings. The agents who are
uninsured and had to rely on their own income and savings to cover medical costs have now less
incentive to save under the health insurance voucher program. Also, agents are forced to pay higher
taxes which reduces their income and therefore lowers savings.
Universal coverage and cost. The introduction of a universal health insurance voucher
program completely eliminates the adverse selection problem that plagues private health insurance
markets as it is now optimal for every agent to buy health insurance since the voucher covers 100
percent of the premium. In order to ﬁnance this program the government has to introduce a new
payroll tax τv in the amount of 8.2 percent. On the other hand, Medicare is abolished so that the
Medicare payroll tax drops to zero. The diﬀerence between the new payroll tax for vouchers and
the old payroll tax for Medicare is about 6 percent and represents a direct measure of the cost of
full insurance coverage in the U.S.
Health spending. The microeconomic-based insurance literature predicts that medical spend-
ing increases with the introduction of insurance programs due to moral hazard. In contrast, our
macroeconomic-based model results are more complex. The eﬀect on medical spending is not driven
only by individuals’ optimal reaction to relatively “cheaper” medical services but also by general
equilibrium eﬀects on savings and consumption. The latter eﬀects are caused by increased payroll
taxes and by general equilibrium price and income adjustments. Speciﬁcally, a new risk sharing
mechanism with health insurance vouchers severely aﬀects individuals’ choice of consumption, sav-
ings, insurance, and medical services, which in turn aﬀect equilibrium prices such as the wage
rate, the rental rate of capital and the insurance premium. These changes in prices feed back into
determining household income and the relative resource allocations between consumption and sav-
ings. These general equilibrium price substitution and income eﬀects are important determinants
of whether individuals end up spending more or less on their health. The ﬁnal or overall eﬀect of
vouchers on medical expenditure therefore depends on how all these eﬀects play out.
Our results indicate that this particular health care reform increases the share of GDP spent on
health care by 0.6 percent. Multiple eﬀects are at work. The higher payroll tax creates a very large
negative income eﬀect that will decrease spending on health services. However, a large fraction
25of the population is now newly insured and will increase their health expenditure (moral hazard).
Total health expenditures increase by 1.5 percent. Or in other words, poorer agents end up buying
more of the cheaper good.
Welfare. All social insurance programs that are ﬁnanced by tax revenues face a trade-oﬀ
between the gains from insurance and the losses created by distortions of incentives. The universal
health insurance voucher program is no exception. On one hand, the system creates incentives for
all individuals to buy health insurance (insurance eﬀect). On the other hand, the voucher system
creates incentive problems as it increases tax rates, discourages individuals to save for self-insurance,
and encourages increased health spending (moral hazard) which leads to eﬃciency loss (incentive
eﬀect).
We next explore how these two eﬀects interact in terms of consumer welfare. We calculate trans-
ition dynamics of welfare from the status quo equilibrium without vouchers to an equilibrium with
universal health insurance vouchers. We then use two welfare measures, the ﬁrst is compensating
consumption as fraction of GDP in each time period and the second is compensating consumption
as percentage of lifetime income for each generation. The ﬁrst measure puts a price tag on the
reform as it expresses lost (or gained) consumption in terms of GDP. The second measure identiﬁes
the winner or loser generation from the reform. We present details of the welfare measures in a
technical appendix that is available from our website. The welfare eﬀects are shown in ﬁgure 4.
The introduction of a universal public health insurance program has two opposing eﬀects on
individual welfare. On one hand, public health insurance lowers welfare because of higher tax rates
that are required to ﬁnance the public program. Higher taxes crowd out savings and therefore
lower aggregate capital. On the other hand, the public insurance program provides a mechanism
to share health risk across families and age groups, which is welfare improving. In addition, some
previously uninsured individuals have now access to cheap health care and are able to increase their
health levels.
We ﬁnd that the voucher program results in an overall welfare gain. This result indicates that
the welfare gain resulting from the insurance function of the public voucher program outweighs the
welfare loss due to the eﬃciency loss caused by higher tax rates. This is an interesting result, since
the transition graph in ﬁgure 3 reveals that aggregate consumption rates drop slightly, however,
aggregate health capital levels increase and outweigh the drop in consumption rates. That is, the
value of health as a consumption good, outweighs the moderate loss of ﬁnal consumption goods
so that in terms of welfare, agents are better oﬀ. It also implies that the current health insurance
system does not eﬃciently trade oﬀ insurance and eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst panel indicates how much it would cost in terms of GDP to make all agents indiﬀerent
between the reform and the status quo. The graph indicates that welfare gains are between 3 and
6 percent of GDP.
The second panel in ﬁgure 4 indicates that all the generations born before and after the health
care voucher reform would beneﬁt from it. It also shows a non-monotonicity in welfare gains. The
generations born before the reform gain between 20 to 30 percent of their lifetime consumption
(hence the negative! compensating consumption measures). The generations born after the reform
26gain roughly 5 percent of their lifetime consumption. These retired agents have higher welfare
gain because of two reasons. First, the new public health insurance program crowds out private
savings, which results in less capital accumulation and higher interest rates. The retired agents who
had made their savings decision based on lower interest rates before become richer due to capital
gain. Hence, the unanticipated voucher reform results in increasing interest rates and the general
equilibrium wealth eﬀect. The retired agents’ savings income go up due to this general equilibrium
eﬀect. Second, the retired agents do not work so they have no labor income. Higher payroll tax
and negative general equilibrium wage adjustment result no wealth eﬀect. Throughout the analysis
we therefore see retired households beneﬁting more from the reform in welfare terms than ones who
are born after the reform.
Somewhat diﬀerent from studies about privatizing social security using stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models (e.g. see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu
and Joines (1995)), our welfare results imply that publicly ﬁnanced health insurance vouchers lead
to welfare gains over a system where workers are either insured by private insurance companies or
where workers decide to self insure by increasing their savings rate.
Alternative ﬁnancing instruments. We next explore the eﬀects of alternative tax ﬁnancing
instruments like a consumption tax (Regime 2) and a lump-sum tax (Regime 3).
Consumption tax: In contrast to the previous experiment (Regime 1: payroll tax), we ﬁnd
a higher rate of capital accumulation when consumption tax is used as a ﬁnancing instrument
(Regime 2) so that steady state capital stock only decreases by 1.7 percent. There are at least two
reasons for this. When the government decides to abolish Medicare which is ﬁnanced by a payroll
tax in order to replace it with vouchers that are ﬁnanced by a consumption tax, the eﬀective price
of ﬁnal consumption goods increases as the consumption tax increases from 5.1 percent in the
initial steady state to 18 percent in the new steady state. Agents will start consuming less of the
ﬁnal consumption good and start directing their spending towards medical services. Second, the
abolishment of Medicare presents a savings motive as older agents cannot expect to receive cheap
healthcare when old. Savings can happen in two forms, either additional investments into health
capital or as investments into physical capital. The availability of health insurance, makes the ﬁrst
more attractive, so that the physical savings rate drops slightly below benchmark.
In addition, we ﬁnd that aggregate health expenditures as a fraction of GDP increase. The
logic behind this is that ﬁrst, the increase in health spending by previously uninsured young agents
increases due to moral hazard. Also, since the relative price of the ﬁnal consumption good in-
creases signiﬁcantly, agents who were previously insured will also increase their health spending.
In addition, the slight drop in output also increases this ratio.
Transitions are presented in ﬁgure 5 and welfare results are presented in ﬁgure 6. The graph
indicates welfare losses of 2 to 3 percent of compensating consumption as a fraction of GDP for the
periods after the reform. This welfare loss is due to the severe drop in ﬁnal goods consumption rates
and a direct consequence of the high sales taxes. When investigating welfare for each generation
we do ﬁnd welfare gains for some generations born and retired before the reform. We already
pointed out before that retired generations can partly beneﬁt from sightly higher interest rates
27which increases their income from savings.
Lump-sum tax: Finally we investigate how a voucher program ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax
(Regime 3) on all households would aﬀect the insurance vs. eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Lump-sum taxation
is considered less distortive than payroll taxes so that this experiment is almost output neutral. The
capital stock only drops by 2.5 percent and output drops by 0.8 percent. However, the redistributive
or “insurance” eﬀects are smaller since there is no progressivity built into this type of tax system.
In addition, the negative income eﬀect lowers the consumption possibilities of the agents. Overall
we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects outweigh the positive eﬀects in terms of welfare (see ﬁgure 8).
Health Productivity and Human Capital Eﬀect. The new risk-sharing arrangement will
also aﬀect capital accumulation and equilibrium prices, which in turn inﬂuence the demand for
health care and health capital accumulation. If health is associated with labor productivity and
spending on health is an investment as argued in Grossman (1972b), then the formation of human
capital will be aﬀected by the voucher program. That is, the voucher system induces individuals
to accumulate more health capital as it eliminates the adverse selection problem.
In all our previous experiments we chose health productivity parameter θ = 0 so that we
eﬀectively turned oﬀ the inﬂuence of health on the formation of human capital. Health is therefore
only held for its consumption value. Health therefore did not aﬀect income or output via the
production process. If, on the other hand, one believes that health can also be an investment good,
as it produces more healthy work time, then θ > 0 and health will aﬀect the formation of human
capital. This has important consequences for individual household income but also for aggregate
output, which in turn has implications on welfare.
We therefore set θ = 1 and recalibrate the model as our new benchmark. We then conduct the
same policy experiments that we already described above when θ = 0 and the human capital eﬀect
was turned oﬀ. We ﬁrst introduce the universal voucher system ﬁnanced by a payroll tax (Regime
1), then a consumption tax (Regime 2), and ﬁnally a lump-sum tax (Regime 3). We report the
results of these experiments in table 5.
In general we ﬁnd that our results are still valid when the human capital eﬀect is turned on. For
Regime 1 where a new payroll tax ﬁnances the vouchers, we again ﬁnd that the negative income
eﬀects due to the higher payroll tax stiﬂes savings, which in turn lowers the new steady state capital
stock. However, the human capital eﬀect mitigates the drop in savings somewhat compared to our
earlier experiment so that aggregate output drops by less. At the same time the growth in health
capital is lower with the human capital eﬀect turned on. The reason is again a general equilibrium
eﬀect via wages. As we can see from the transition graph in ﬁgure
The diﬀerences in the eﬀects between regime 1 with θ = 0 and regime 1 with θ = 1 are small
though and the diﬀerences in terms of welfare are negligible, compared the two curves in ﬁgure 4.
When consumption taxes ﬁnance the vouchers, we see that the eﬃciency results are strengthened.
The savings rate increases marginally by 0.08 percent. This has to do with higher prices for ﬁnal
consumption goods, but also with higher health capital levels. Since higher health capital levels
now increase human capital levels, ﬁrms will demand more physical capital as it is complementary
to human capital in the ﬁnal goods production process. This channel was absent in our earlier
28analysis with θ = 0 (no human capital eﬀect of health). We ﬁnd small eﬃciency gains as overall
output increases by 0.3 percent (when θ = 0, output decrease by 0.7 percent). As every agent holds
insurance, health spending increases (moral hazard) which increases the health capital stock. Since
health capital is productive, more physical will be accumulated as well due to complementarities
in the ﬁnal goods production process. Overall, the output eﬀect will be magniﬁed. This in turn
creates larger income eﬀects. As consumption taxes again rise from 4.6 percent in the benchmark
economy to more than 17 percent, agents experience welfare losses despite their better health states.
Regime 3 results change the most when the human capital eﬀect is active. Now the policy reform
increase output (eﬃciency gain). However, the lump-sum tax creates a large enough negative income
eﬀect, to decrease welfare for most generations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we make two key contributions to the literature. First, we integrate the health accu-
mulation and health insurance decisions into a dynamic general equilibrium consumption/savings
model where households are exposed to health shocks over the life-cycle. In our model households
choose consumption, savings, health insurance, and medical expenditures to maximize expected life-
time utility. That is, demand for health insurance and demand for medical services/expenditures
are explicitly derived from a household utility maximization problem. Our calibrated model is cap-
able to match life-cycle trends of average medical expenditures and insurance take-up ratios from
MEPS. Second, this comprehensive modelling tool allows us to analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects
of reforming public and private health insurance markets. More speciﬁcally, we apply our model to
study the implications of a universal health insurance voucher system.
Health insurance voucher programs seem to be a promising solution to insure 100 percent of the
U.S. population but cannot control the steady increase in health care expenditures. Proponents
of vouchers have argued that the government is better able to control the rise in health care
spending using a voucher system as vouchers will replace government run Medicare (which will
be insolvent soon) with private health insurance contracts. Private insurers are supposedly better
able to monitor health care providers and to control costs. Our analysis however suggests, that
aggregate spending on health would increase and possible growth eﬀects due to better health do not
compensate for the additional spending. Growth eﬀects only materialize when the right ﬁnancing
instrument is in place. It is therefore crucial to use either a consumption or lump-sum tax in order
to trigger growth eﬀects.
We think our approach presents a conservative evaluation of a voucher system as we completely
abstract from any eﬃciency gains due to increased competition and monitoring. However, there is
some empirical evidence suggesting that these eﬃciency gains could be small. Future work needs to
carefully model the competitive environment that the insurance companies work in. Our analysis
also raises the important question about how to best ﬁnance the health care reform. Or in other
words, what is the best mix of taxes to achieve maximum insurance eﬀects and gain maximum
eﬃciency? In addition, as the labor-leisure choice is exogenous in our model, the tax-ﬁnancing
29eﬀects on labor supply via increasing payroll tax is under-estimated. As pointed out in Fuster,
Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) this channel has important implications for welfare analysis.
Finally, it will be important to analyze whether vouchers could create a possible insurance gap if
the voucher system is under funded. If voucher payments turn out to be insuﬃcient, then insurance
companies would have to operate at a loss when covering certain underfunded risk types. In the
extreme this could lead to a complete unravelling of the private health insurance markets, where
insurance companies would drop out of the voucher market. In this case the government would
have to provide a public insurance alternative if it wants to maintain high coverage rates. However,
then the question of sustainability of such a publicly run system is reintroduced, as this system
would face similar problems as Medicaid/Medicare faces today. We leave these important questions
for future research.
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347 Appendix
7.1 Equilibrium status quo
Deﬁnition 1 Given the transition probability matrices {Pj,Πj}
J
j=1 , and Ωincome, the survival prob-
abilities {πj}
J
j=1 and the exogenous government policies
￿
˜ τ (˜ y(xj)),τC￿J
j=1 , a competitive equilib-




j=1 of individual household decisions
{cj (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 , aggregate stocks of physical capital and human capital
{K,L}, factor prices {w,q,R}, and insurance premiums {p,p(j,h)}
J
j=1 such that
(a) {cj (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 solves the consumer problem (15) respectively (16)
(b) the ﬁrm ﬁrst order conditions hold
w = FL (K,L),
q = FK (K,L),


























(d) the aggregate resource constraint holds




(c(xj) + pm (xj)m(xj))dΛ(xj) = Y + (1 − δ)K,
(e) the government programs clear so that (11), (12), (13), and (14) hold,
(f) the budget constraints of insurance companies (9) and (10) hold









where Tµ,Λ is a one period transition operator on the distribution.
357.2 Equilibrium with health insurance vouchers
Deﬁnition 2 Given the transition probability matrices {Pj,Πj}
J
j=1 , and Ωincome, the survival prob-
abilities {πj}
J
j=1 and the exogenous government policies
￿
˜ τ (˜ y(xj)),τC,τV ,τLS,v (xj)
￿J
j=1 , a competitive equilibrium with health insurance vouchers is a




j=1 of individual household decisions
{cj (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 , aggregate stocks of physical capital and human capital
{K,L}, factor prices {w,q,R}, and insurance premiums {p(xj)}
J
j=1 such that
(a) {cj (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 solves the consumer problem (22)
(b) the ﬁrm ﬁrst order conditions hold
w = FL (K,L),
q = FK (K,L),


























(d) the aggregate resource constraint holds




(c(xj) + pm (xj)m(xj))dΛ(xj) = Y + (1 − δ)K,
(e) the government programs clear so that (12), (14), and either (19), (20), or (21) hold,
(f) the health voucher payments clear (18)









where Tµ,Λ is a one period transition operator on the distribution.
367.3 Tables and ﬁgures
Parameters: Explanation/Source:
- Periods working J1 = 9
- Periods retired J2 = 5
- Population growth rate n = 1.2% CEA (1998)
- Years modeled years = 72 from age 20 to 92
- Total factor productivity A = 1 normalization
- Capital share in production α = 0.36 standard value
- Capital depreciation δ = 15% Kydland and Prescott (1982)
- Price for medical care
for insured
pm,Ins = 1.15 U.S. Census 2004
- Price for medical care
for uninsured
pm,nIns = 1.55 U.S. Census 2004
- Deductible (in %
of median income)
γ = 1.7%




spending of the old)
γMed = 6%
to match γ/γMed = 0.28
according to
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
and the U.S. Department of Health
- Coinsurance rate, Medicare ρMed = 0.30
Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (2005)
Table 1: External Paramters
37Parameters: Explanation/Source:
- Relative risk aversion σ = 2.5 to match K
Y and R 1
- Preference on consumption η = 0.9 to match
p×M
Y 1
- Discount factor β = 1.01 to match K
Y and R 1
- Health production productivity φj= 1 for all j = {1,...,J} to match
p×M
Y 1
- Production parameter of health ξ = 0.32 to match
p×M
Y 1
- Health depreciation δh= [.0675 − 0.52] to match
p×M
Y 9
- Human capital production χ = 0.9 to match income distribution 1
- Health productivity θ = 0 used for sensitivity analysis 1
- Health Shocks [0.01,0.91] 2
- Health transition prob. see text 2
- Pension replacement rate Ψ = 45% to match τsoc= 10% 1




Table 2: Free parameters used to match some target moments in the data.
Parameters Model Data Source
- Medical expenses per GDP:
pm×M
Y 10.01% 12% MEPS (population 20-85) 1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance, not counting
uninsured in ﬁrst generation)
60% 60% MEPS 2005 1
- Fraction of insured retirees: 100% 99.7% MEPS 2005
Ratio deductible vs. average premium
- Private plan: γ/
￿
j µjpj 0.3 0.07 to0.23
Fronstin and Collins (2006),
Claxton et al. (2006), and





j 1 1 U.S. Department of Health 2006 1
- Capital output ratio: K/Y 2.6 3 NIPA 1
- Interest rate: R 4% 4% NIPA 1
- Residual Government spending: G/Y 18% 20.2% Castaneda et al. (2003) 1
- Size of Social Security: SocSec/Y 6% 5% Social Security Administration 2002 1
- Size of Medicare: Medicare/Y 2.1% 2.5% U.S. Department of Health 2002 1
- Fraction over 65 17.34% 17.4% U.S. Census 2005
- Payroll tax Social Security: τSoc 10.0% 6% − 10% IRS 1
- Consumption tax: τC 7% 1
- Payroll tax Medicare: τMed 2.1% 2.5% Social Security Update 2007 1
-Total tax revenue/Y 26% 28.3%
Stephenson (1998) and
Barro and Sahasakul (1986)
1
- Gini Income 0.27 0.55 Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) 1
- Savings proﬁle see ﬁgure 2 3
- Insurance take-up ratios see ﬁgure 2 3
Total number of Moments 22
Table 3: Data vs. Model
38Benchmark Voucher: Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Output: Y 100.000 96.210 99.382 99.138
Capital: K 100.000 89.823 98.293 97.625
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 101.538 107.858 105.126
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y 0.100 0.106 0.109 0.106
Consumption: C 100.000 97.602 96.227 96.497
C/Y 0.403 0.409 0.390 0.392
Human capital: H 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
HH gross income 11.100 10.733 10.905 10.930
K/Y 2.608 2.435 2.579 2.568
Interest rate: R in % 3.981 4.704 3.958 4.076
Wages: w 100.000 96.210 99.382 99.138
Voucher Payments in % of GDP 0.000 5.208 5.583 5.373
Consumption tax: τC 5.155 5.676 18.049 4.406
Payroll voucher tax: τV 0.000 8.227 0.000 0.000
Lump sum voucher tax: τLump in % of HH income 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.407
Social security tax: τSS in % 9.538 9.300 9.231 9.326
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 2.087 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 15.781 15.538 16.111 16.166
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 25.177 29.075 29.060 29.199
Social insurance: TSi/Y 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Steady state results for the benchmark economy and three policy experiments with health
productivity θ = 0. Column one is the no voucher regime, Regime 1: payroll tax, Regime 2:
consumption tax, and Regime 3: lump-sum tax.
39Benchmark Voucher: Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Output: Y 100.000 96.747 100.273 100.249
Capital: K 100.000 90.902 100.078 100.115
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 98.577 107.454 104.084
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y 0.103 0.105 0.111 0.107
Consumption: C 100.000 98.346 96.548 96.893
C/Y 0.408 0.415 0.393 0.394
Human capital: H 100.000 100.199 100.382 100.324
HH gross income 11.994 11.651 11.853 11.900
K/Y 2.550 2.396 2.545 2.547
Interest rate: R in % 4.251 4.919 4.121 4.181
Wages: w 100.000 96.555 99.891 99.925
Voucher Payments in % of GDP 0.000 5.227 5.673 5.521
Consumption tax: τC 4.611 5.036 17.619 3.842
Payroll voucher tax: τV 0.000 8.244 0.000 0.000
Lump sum voucher tax: τLump in % of HH income 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.551
Social security tax: τSS in % 9.583 9.302 9.224 9.344
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 1.804 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 15.976 15.786 16.338 16.394
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 24.995 29.102 29.158 29.352
Social insurance: TSi/Y 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5: Steady state results for the benchmark economy and three policy experiments with health
productivity θ = 1. Column one is the no voucher regime, Regime 1: payroll tax, Regime 2:
consumption tax, and Regime 3: lump-sum tax.
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Figure 1: MEPS 2004/2005 take up rates of private health insurance and health spending as percent
of household income over the life-cycle.
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Figure 2: Steady state results for the benchmark (U.S.) economy and the economy with universal
health insurance vouchers and θ = 0.

























































Figure 3: Regime 1 (payroll tax): Transition dynamics due to the introduction of universal health
insurance vouchers into the current U.S. economy and a payroll tax ﬁnances the vouchers.































































Figure 4: Regime 1 (payroll tax): Welfare dynamics resulting from the introduction of universal
health care vouchers and a payroll tax ﬁnances the vouchers.

























































Figure 5: Regime 2 (consumption tax): Transition dynamics due to the introduction of univer-
sal health insurance vouchers into the current U.S. economy and a consumption tax ﬁnances the
vouchers.































































Figure 6: Regime 2 (consumption tax): Welfare dynamics resulting from the introduction of uni-
versal health care vouchers and θ = 0 and a consumption tax ﬁnances the vouchers.

























































Figure 7: Regime 3 (lump-sum tax): Transition dynamics due to the introduction of universal health
insurance vouchers into the current U.S. economy and a lump-sum tax ﬁnances the vouchers.































































Figure 8: Regime 3 (lump-sum tax): Welfare dynamics resulting from the introduction of universal
health care vouchers and a lump-sum tax ﬁnances the vouchers.
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